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In the 1960's, Blacks and Whites chose relatively similar
first names for their children. Over a short period of time in
the early 1970's, that pattern changed dramatically with
most Blacks (particularly those living in racially isolated
neighborhoods) adopting increasingly distinctive names,
but a subset of Blacks actually moving toward more
assimilating names. The patterns in the data appear most
consistent with a model in which the rise of the Black
Power movement influenced how Blacks perceived their
identities. Among Blacks born in the last two decades,
names provide a strong signal of socio-economic status,
which was not previously the case. We find, however, no
negative causal impact of having a distinctively Black name
on life outcomes. Although that result is seemingly in
conflict with previous audit studies involving resumes, we
argue that the two sets of findings can be reconciled.  
*** 
Steven D. Levitt is professor of economics at the University of
Chicago. Levitt graduated with a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT in
1994 and then joined the faculty at University of Chicago. He was
a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.  
Steven Levitt is a first-rate empirical researcher whose interests
span many social sciences - economics, politics, sociology, and
law. His innovative empirical investigations have examined the
causes of crime, and the potency of methods of deterrence. His
novel identification strategies have made possible a better
understanding of fundamental and longstanding puzzles. 
In work on crime and deterrence, Levitt's research shows that
policies that increase incarceration have a greater impact on
crime rates than was previously thought. His QJE (1996) paper
demonstrates this enhancement by using prison-overcrowding
litigation to break the endogenous correlation of crime rates and
incarceration rates. This identification exploits the notion that
overcrowding litigation is likely to affect crime rates only through
its impact on the prison population. The JPE (1998) paper
explains the recent trend toward youth rather than adult crime as
a response to differential incentives. In their JEL (1999) paper,
Kessler and Levitt use the introduction of sentence increases in
California to produce evidence in favor of "deterrence" theories of
incarceration in contrast to "incapacitation" theories. Levitt (AER,
1997) shows that increases in the police force reduce the number
of violent crimes much more substantially than the number of
property crimes.  
This body of papers uses four distinct and novel identification
strategies, each with thoughtful consideration of strengths and
weaknesses, to examine the same important issue. In his QJE
paper (1998, with Ian Ayres), Levitt studies the benefits to
reducing car theft from installing a hidden radio transmitter
device called a Lojack. He finds that the private benefit to those
who install a Lojack is dwarfed by the social benefit of general
deterrence. 
Levitt's research on street gangs (QJE 2000, with Vekatesh)
debunks the popular view that most youth crimes are the work of
a few super-predators, who are largely unresponsive to
incentives. It also elucidates why gang members work for low
wages and what role is played by gang patriotism. Donohue and
Levitt (QJE 2001) find that legalized abortion has the indirect
effect of reducing crime by reducing the size of the "unwanted,"
and thus less cared for, children. Duggan and Levitt (AER 2002)
document how corruption alters the outcome of Sumo wrestling.  
In his JPE (1994) paper, Levitt finds that a challenger's spending
in an election has much less of an impact than suggested by
previous research. He argues that the rewards to spending are
quite similar between incumbents and challengers. Levitt (AER,
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1996) used the preferences revealed from role-call voting to 
show that the senator's own ideology is the primary determinant 
of his/her voting patterns. Voter and party preferences are 
secondary.  
Levitt has interesting work on other topics as well, including 
drunk driving, and testing game-theoretic models of soccer, and
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